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Australia’s Continued Struggle with Asylum Seekers Who Arrive by Boat – 
How Consistent is the Current Policy Approach with Australia’s International 







Australia’s latest policy approach to asylum seekers who arrive by boat, Operation 
Sovereign Borders, shifts the human rights focusfrom Australia’s own asylum seeker 
assessment and resettlement processes towards the human rights safeguards 
Australia has put in place under its offshore regime. An examination of these 
safeguards suggests a deterioration in Australia’s commitment to meet its human 






Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB) is Australia’s current policy on asylum seekers 
who arrive by boat.2The stated intent of this policy is ‘to combat people smuggling 
and to protect our borders’.3  In practice this involves refusing asylum seekers who 
arrive or attempt to arrive by boat, refugee status assessment or resettlement in 
Australia.  Key elements of OSB are turning asylum seeker boats back to source and 
transit countries; offshore processing and resettlement; and resolving the legacy 
caseload of asylum seeker boat arrivals currently awaiting assessment in Australia.4 
 
                                                             
1Associate Lecturer, Field Education, Department of Social Work, College of Arts, Society and 
Education, James Cook University, Cairns 4870 
2Operation Sovereign Borders officially began on 18 September 2013. 
3LNP Coalition, Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB), 26 July 2013, http://www.liberal.org.au/latest-
news/2013/07/26/operation-sovereign-borders, 2. 
4Ibid 5, 15, 16. 
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The Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) has identified that 
Australia as signatory to a range of human rights instruments, owes the following key 
human rights obligations to asylum seekers who arrive by boat:5 
 
People should not be returned to a country where their life or freedom would 
be threatened (principle of  ‘non-refoulement’)6 
Everyone has the right not to be subjected to arbitrary detention7 
 
Children should only be detained as a measure of last resort, and for the 
shortest appropriate period of time8 
 
In all actions concerning children, the best interests of the child should be a 
primary consideration9 
 
Anyone who is detained has the right to challenge the legality of their 
detention in court10 
 
All persons who are detained should be treated with humanity and respect 
for their inherent dignity11 
 
No one should be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment12 
 
Everyone is entitled to respect for their human rights without 
discrimination13 
                                                             
5Australian Human Rights Commission, Asylum seekers, refugees and human rights: Snapshot report 
2013 (Snapshot Report), 
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/document/publication/snapshot_report_2013.p
df28. 
6Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 150 (entered force 28 July 1951), as 
amended by its 1967 Protocol, 19 UST 6223 (Refugee Convention), art 33; International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered force 3 
November 1976) (ICCPR) at least arts 6 and 7; Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 UNTS 3 
(entered force 20 Nov 1989) (CRC) arts 6 and 37; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1465 UNTS 85, 113 (entered force 10 Dec 1984) (CAT) arts 3 and 16. 
7ICCPR art 9(1); CRC art 37(b). 
8CRC art 37(b). 
9CRC art 3(1) and art 18(1). 
10ICCPR art 9(4); CRC art 37(d). 
11ICCPR art 10; CRC art 37(c). 
12ICCPR art 7; CAT art 2 and art 16; CRC art 37(a). 




Asylum seekers should not be penalised for arriving in a country without 
authorisation14 
 
Everyone is entitled to enjoy the highest attainable standard of mental and 
physical health15 
Everyone has the right to have their family protected from arbitrary or 
unlawful interference16 
 
Australia is yet to report to any United Nations committee on the extent to 
which the OSB approach implemented in September 2013 meets its human rights 
obligations.  However, many elements of OSB pre-existed the policy, and the Human 
Rights Committee and other UN committees have found some of these pre-existing 
elements to engage human rights obligations including in the following areas: 
 
Arbitrary detention of asylum seekers17 
Poor conditions in Australian detention centres18 
Poor treatment of child asylum seekers19 
Dis-respect for the principle of non-refoulement20 
 
This paper examineseach of the three key elements of OSB noted above with 
a view to identifying whether the policy improves or worsens Australia’s compliance 
with its human rights obligations to asylum seekers who arrive by boat.  This will be 
done by identifying actual and potential inconsistencies between the implementation 
of the policy and Australia’s obligations.  
                                                                                                                                                                        
13ICCPR art 2(1) and art 26; CRC art 2; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 
UNTS 3 (entered force 16 Dec 1966) (ICESCR) art 2(2). 
14Refugee Convention art 31. 
15ICESCR art 12. 
16ICCPR art 17 and art 23; CRC art 8(1). 
17For example, Human Rights Committee, F.K.A.G. et al v Australia, Communication No. 2094/2011, 
UN Doc  CCPR/ C/108/D/2094/2011; Committee Against Torture, Concluding observations of the 
Committee against Torture: Australia, Fortieth session, 28 April – 16 May 2008, CAT/C/AUS/CO/1 
at [11] 
18For example, in Human Rights Committee, Madafferi v Australia, Communication No. 1011/2001, 
UN Doc CCPR/C/81/D/1011/2001 (2004) at [9.3]. 
19Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations: Australia, Sixtieth sess, 
CRC/C/AUS/CO/4, (15 June 2012) 80. 
20Human Rights Committee, Consideration of reports submitted by states parties under article 40 of 
the covenant, Concluding observations, Australia, UN Doc CCPR/C/AUS/CO/5, (2 April 2009) 6. 
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II. Turning Asylum Seeker Boats Back to Source and Transit Countries 
 
A The Policy Approach 
 
This element of OSB involves stopping the entry of detected Suspected Illegal 
Entry Vessels (SIEVs) into Australian territoryvia interception and transfer of 
passengers to an external location.21 
The Minister recently reported ‘in the first eight months of 2014, just one 
people smuggling venture made it to Australia’.22 
 
Information is scarce on the number of boats being turned around.  Although, 
it is known that 157 asylum seekers spent most of July 2014 on a Customs boat as the 
Australian Government unsuccessfully sought ways to send them back to India. The 
group were taken to Nauru where they remain in detention.23 
 
In October 2014 the High Court began hearing a case brought by one of 
those asylum seekers (CPCF) to decide the validity of using the Maritime Powers Act 
to detain the asylum seekers at sea. The decision may affect the way the Government 
either intercepts asylum seekers at sea, or the way it holds them and where it takes 
them.24 
 
Perhaps pre-empting the possibility of a negative finding, a Billintroduced to 
parliament in September 2014 contains amendments to the Maritime Powers Act to 
‘provide additional clarity and consistency in the powers to detain and move vessels 
and persons’.25The High Court decision and/or the final passage of the Bill may 
influence the current policy of turning the boats around and result inan alternate 
approach. 
 
B Australia’s international human rights obligations 
 
                                                             
21LNP Coalition, above n 2, 7. 
22HonScott Morrison MP, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, Restoring integrity and 
public confidence in Immigration and Border Protection,Address to the National Press Club, Canberra, 
Wednesday, 10 September 2014.http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/sm/2014/sm217736.htm 
23James Glenday, ABC Radio National, The World Today, 14 October 2014. 
24Ibid. 
25Hon Scott Morrison MP, Second ReadingSpeech, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment 
(Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014, Thursday, 25 September 2014, House of Representatives, 
Commonwealth of Australia. 




The policy of turning asylum seeker boats back undermines the fundamental 
human right enshrined in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights to seek and 
enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.26 
 
This policy may also be inconsistent with international obligations in relation 
to non-refoulement27 and arbitrary detention28.   
 
Australia has broad non-refoulement obligations under the ICCPR, CRC and 
CAT to ensure protection from removal to a country where people face a real risk of 
significant harm. These are known as ‘complementary protection’ obligations.  
Australia also has non-refoulement obligations under the Refugee Convention29 which 
prohibits expelling refugees to territories where their lives or freedom would be 
threatened on the basis of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion.30 
 
This policy raises doubts about ensuring protection for asylum seekers who 
are turned around, from ending up in a country where they face a real risk of 
significant harm and/or threats to their freedom.  It also raises doubts about ensuring 
protection from arbitrary detention at sea.  A lack of available information on boat 
interceptions makes it difficult to determine further. 
 
In his recent opening statement the new United Nations Commissioner for 
Human Rights commented: 
 
Australia's policy of off-shore processing for asylum seekers arriving by sea, 
and its interception and turning back of vessels, is leading to a chain of human rights 
violations, including arbitrary detention and possible torture following return to home 
countries. It could also lead to the resettlement of migrants in countries that are not 
adequately equipped.31 
                                                             
26Australian Human Rights Commission, Australia’s obligation to people seeking asylum who are intercepted at sea.media 
statement, 4 July 2014.  https://www.humanrights.gov.au/news/stories/australia-s-obligation-people-seeking-
asylum-who-are-intercepted-sea 
27Refugee Convention art 33; ICCPR arts 6 and 7; CRC arts 6 and 37; CAT arts 3 and 16. 
28ICCPR art 9(1); CRC art 37(b). 
29Refugee Convention, art 31(a). 
30Australian Human Rights Commission, Examination of the Migration (Regional Processing) package of legislation, 
submitted to Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, 31 January 2013, [84-95]. 
31United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Opening Statement by ZeidRa'ad Al Hussein United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights at the Human Rights Council 27th Session, Geneva, 8 September 2014, 5. 
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These results of turning back the boats back and offshore processing are 
examined further below. 
 
III. Offshore Processing and Resettlement 
 
A The Policy 
 
This element of Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB) involves establishing ‘genuine 
and rigorous’ third country offshore processing on Nauru and Manus Island (PNG) 
for all asylum seekers who arrive(d) by boat after 19 July 2013, and resettlement to a 
third country.32 
 
Part of the justification for this approach is:   
 
If (refugee resettlement) remains simply the responsibility of first world 
nations then not only will the number of places remain limited but the programme 
itself will become a pull factor for people smuggling.33 
 
Offshore processing was re-introduced in 2012 for asylum seekers who arrive 
in Australia by boat at an ‘excised offshore place’34 and extended in May 2013 to apply 
to asylum seekers who arrive by boat anywhere in Australia.35  Also in 2013, Nauru 
and Papua New Guinea (PNG) were designated as ‘regional processing countries’, 
and later a Regional Resettlement Arrangement (RRA) with the Government of 
PNGand a new MOU with Nauru were signed.36In September 2014, the Government 
signed a voluntary resettlement agreement with Cambodia.37 
 
The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister) reported 
in September 2014 that ‘more than 1000 people transferred to Nauru have 
commenced their claims assessment and 206 people found to be refugees have been 
resettled on Nauru’.   
                                                             
32LNP Coalition, above n 2, 5 and 7. 
33Hon. Scott Morrison, above n 21. 
34Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures) Act 2012 (Cth). 
35Australian Human Rights Commission, Asylum seekers and refugees guide, 
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/asylum-seekers-and-refugees-guide, [at 10 October 2014]. 
36Australian Human Rights Commission, Transfer of Asylum Seekers to Third Countries, 1 January 2014, 
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/transfer-asylum-seekers-third-countries . 
37HonScott Morrison MP, Reintroducing TPVs,press conference, 26 September 2014. 
http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/sm/2014/sm218131.htm 




There are also more than 1000 people who have been transferred to Manus 
Island for assessment.   
 
Very few if any assessments of their refugee status have been completed38 and 
the Minister recently reported the PNG resettlement programme has now been 
before the PNG Cabinet for several months.39 
 
B Australia’s international human rights obligations 
 
International law does not prohibit offshore processing and once transferred 
to offshore processing destinations, asylum seekers’ claims for protection are 
processed under the laws of that country.  However, Australia may remain liable for 
the international human rights consequences of its action of transferring them, so is 
responsible to ensure that adequate human rights safeguards are in place in those 
countries.40 
 
There are serious human rights concerns in relation to the processing regimes 
on both Manus Island and Nauru, suggesting inadequate human rights safeguards 
have been put in place by Australia.  This is hardly surprising given Australia’s own 
poor human rights record on the processing of asylum seekers. These same and other 
concerns are reflected when the processing of asylum seeker claims in both Nauru 
and Manus Island are examined against Australia’s human rights obligations below.41 
 
1. Obligation not to Treat Asylum Seekers Differently Based on their mode of 
Arrival42 
 
The Refugee Convention prohibits penalising asylum seekers for unauthorized 
arrival in a country.  The policy of ‘regional processing’ for asylum seekers who arrive 
by boat may be construed as penalizing those against other arrivals, on the basis of 
the worse conditions in Regional Processing Centres (RPCs) and resettlement 
outcomes generally (discussed below).43 
                                                             
38As at October 2013 no Refugee Status Determinations had been completed on Manus Island since transfer of 
asylum seekers from Australia commenced in November 2012, UNHCR Monitoring Visit to Manus Island 23-25 
October 2013.   
39Above n 21. 
40Australian Human Rights above n 4, 19. 
41These concerns appeared in Australian Human Rights Commission, above n 35; and Australian Human Rights 
Commission, above n 4, 19. 
42ICCPR art 26; Refugee Convention art 31. 
43Australian Human Rights Commission, above n 29, [104-110]. 
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To discharge its obligation to respect people’s human rights without 
discrimination under the ICCPR,44Australia needs to establish a ‘reasonable’ basis 
for subjecting only asylum seekers who arrive by boat to the ‘regional processing’ 
regime.45  Australia’s rationale for the differential treatment of boat arrivals is ‘to 
combat people smuggling and to protect our borders’.46  It is doubtful this is a 
‘reasonable basis’. 
 
2. Australia’s Non-Refoulement Obligations47 
 
To meet both its complementary protection obligations and its non-
refoulement obligations under the Refugees Convention,48 Australia would need 
safeguards in place to ensure transferred asylum seekers will not be at risk of serious 
harm upon resettlement in a third country and their freedom will not be at risk.49 
 
Australia’s current method of safe guarding its compliance with its 
complementary protection obligations in relation to its offshore processing is via non-
compellable Ministerial discretion to exempt offshore transfers, including where 
‘issues arise in relation to obligations under CAT or ICCPR’.50  It is unlikely such 
discretionary powers provide adequate human rights safeguards to prevent removal to 
a country where people face significant harm. 
 
Available evidence from the RPCs suggests people do indeed face significant 
harm.  This includes humiliating treatment, lack of humane detention conditions, 
profound uncertainty about timing for processing of claims and pressure to return 
home.51  Perhaps because of this, the Human Rights Committee has asked Australia: 
 
Please (also) explain how the transferring of asylum seekers to third countries 
for the processing of their claims is consistent with the State party’s obligations under 
the (ICCPR), most significantly non-refoulement obligations.52 
                                                             
44ICCPR art 26(1). 
45Australian Human Rights Commission, above n 29, [106]. 
46LNP Coalition, above n 2, 2. 
47under ICCPR, CAT, CRC and the Refugee Convention. 
48Art 31(a) 
49Australian Human Rights Commission, above n 29, [84-95]. 
50Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s198E. 
51Amnesty International Australia, This is Still Breaking People, Update On Human Rights Violations At Australia’s 
Asylum Seeker Processing Centre On Manus Island, Papua New Guinea, May 2014, 8-9. 
52Human Rights Committee, List of issues to be considered for Australia’s 6th Report, 106thsess, CCPR/C/AUS/Q/6 
(9November2012). 




3. Obligation not to subject asylum seekers to arbitrary detention53 
 
Available evidence suggesting that detention at the RPCs is arbitrary includes that: 
 
1. both the Nauru and Manus Island processing centres are closed detention 
centres;54 and 
2. there is profound uncertainty about timing for processing of claims at the RPCs. In 
PNG not a single refugee assessment was made in the first 18 months since the 
centre opened.55 
 
The lack of safeguards to prevent against this arbitrary detention is of little 
surprise given a large number of UN bodies have recommended Australia abolish its 
own onshore arbitrary detention regime,56 and that Australia has repeatedly defended 
its position in its domestic courts and to the UN.57 
 
In October 2013 the UNHCR observed that the RPCs at both Manus Island 
and Naru constituted arbitrary and mandatory detention under international law.58 
 
4. Obligation to ensure detained persons are treated with humanity and respect59 
and not subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment60 
 
The AHRC is concerned that asylum seekers transferred to RPCs are being 
exposed to conditions which might breach these obligations.61There is significant 




                                                             
53ICCPR art 9(1); CRC art 37(b). 
54Australian Human Rights Commission, above n 4, 20. 
55Amnesty International Australia, above n 50, 22. 
56eg Human Rights Committee 2009, the Committee Against Torture 2008 and the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child 2012 in their concluding observations on Australia’s reports. 
57eg. Commonwealth of Australia, Common Core Document– incorporating the Fifth Report under the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and the Fourth Report under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
June 2006. 
58The UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR monitoring visit to Manus Island, Papua New Guinea, 23 to 25 October 2013, 1; 
and The UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR monitoring visit to the Republic of Nauru, 7 to 9 October 2013, 1. 
59ICCPR art 10; CRC art 37(c). 
60ICCPR art 7; CAT arts 2 and 16; CRC art 37(a). 
61Australian Human Rights Commission, above n 29, [149-161]. 
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For example, the following has been observed at Manus Island: 
 
…overcrowding …. delivered meals in take-away packs for self-distribution 
and …sole responsibility for cleaning the ablution blocks. …. a security guard is 
responsible for supervising vulnerable individuals with serious mental health needs… 
many lack shoes and/or only have one shirt…62 
 
There is also evidence of risks to mental (and physical) health posed by the 
long-term detention at the RPCs.63 
 
In October 2013 the UNHCR observed that the Regional Processing Centres 
(RPCs) at both Manus Island and Nauru do not provide safe and humane conditions 
of treatment in detention.  UNHCR was also very concerned about the physical and 
mental health of the asylum seekers at both RPCs.64 
 
5. Obligations to children in detention.65 
 
Hundreds of children asylum seekers who arrive(d) by boat are being 
transferred to RPCs with their families. Unaccompanied minors have also been 
transferred due to unsatisfactory age determination processes on Christmas Island.66  
In October 2013 the UNHCR observed the presence of at least two unaccompanied 
children at the Manus Island RPC and had received reports of others.67 
 
A National AHRC Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention is 
currently underway.  It is expected this will provide much needed further information 
on the extent and experience of children in detention in Australia’s RPCs.   
 
Australia has a number of human rights obligations to protect children 
affected by the regional processing arrangements. Australia’s compliance is 
particularly questionable in the following three areas.68 
                                                             
62Amnesty International Australia, above n 50, 4-7. 
63Australian Human Rights Commission, above n 29, [149-161]. 
64The UN Refugee Agency, above n 58 (both), 1-2 (both). 
65CRC arts 2, 3, 8, 18, 20, 22 and 37 3(1) and 18(1). 
66Amnesty International Australia, above n 50, 9. 
67The UN Refugee Agency, above n 58, (Manus Island) 3. 
68Derived from Australian Human Rights Commission, above n 29, [84-95].  Also Megan Mitchell, Children's 
Commissioner, Young people seeking asylum – protecting their rights in Australia, Practitioners Workshop, ‘Improving 
Services for Unaccompanied Minors & Young People Seeking Asylum’, Wednesday 4 December 2013, 3. 




i Obligation to detain children only as a measure of last resort, and for the shortest 
appropriate period of time.69 
 
The mandatory and extended detention of all asylum seekers transferred to 
Nauru and Manus Island, including children, suggests this obligation has been 
engaged.  
 
ii Obligation to treat the best interests of the child as a primary consideration in all 
decision-making concerning children70 
 
In October 2013 the UNHCR observed that the harsh environment at the 
RPC in Nauru is particularly inappropriate for the care of child asylum-seekers and 
was of the view that no child should be transferred from Australia to Nauru,71 
suggesting this obligation has been engaged.   
 
iii Obligation to provide unaccompanied minors with special protection and 
assistance72 
 
Under Australian legislation the Minister ceases to be the guardian of 
unaccompanied minors who are transferred to a ‘regional processing country’.73 On 
Manus Island it is not clear who is the lawful guardian of unaccompanied children.74  
In Nauru, the Minister for Justice is the guardian for unaccompanied minors.75 
 
6. Obligation to protect families from arbitrary or unlawful interference76 
 
If asylum seekers who are transferred to a ‘regional processing country’ 
already have family members in Australia, they face indefinite separation from those 
family members, suggesting this obligation may be engaged.77 
 
                                                             
69CRC art 37(b). 
70CRC art 3(1). 
71The UN Refugee Agency, above n 58, (Nauru) 1-2. 
72CRC arts 20 and 22. 
73Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act 1946 (Cth), ss 6(1) and (2)(b). 
74Amnesty International Australia, above n 50, 9. 
75Australian Human Rights Commission, above n 4, 23. 
76ICCPR art 17 and art 23; CRC art 8(1). 
77Australian Human Rights Commission, above n 29, [177-182]. 
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Offshore processing can be seen to engage or potentially engage a range of 
human rights obligations.  Offshore resettlement also risks engaging Australia’s 
obligations particularly its non-refoulement obligations in cases where there are 
significant risks to safety. 
 
To date, offshore resettlement countries for all asylum seekers who arrive by 
boat include Nauru, Manus Island and Cambodia though resettlement has only really 
begun at Nauru.  Resettlement in third countries is not prohibited at international law.  
However, Australia’s policy of forced resettlement of people seeking asylum (by boat) 
has attracted the concern of the UNHCR because of the extent to which it departs 
from international norms; increases the burden on developing countries to host 
refugees;78 and raises formidable challenges and protection concerns for the 
resettlement process.79 
 
IV. Resolving the Legacy Caseload 
 
A. The Policy 
 
In introducing a recent Bill,80 the Minister explained ‘legacy caseload’ to mean 
those asylum seekers who arrived in Australia by boat before 19 July 2013 as well as 
any who arrived after that time but before 31 December 2013 and have not yet been 
transferred to a RPC. 
 
Key policy strategies for ‘resolving the legacy caseload’ are the reintroduction 
of Temporary Protection Visas (TPVs) and changes to visa assessment processes.81  
Two Bills are currently before Parliament to give effect to these policy strategies:  the 
Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) 
Bill 2014;82 and the Migration Amendment (Protection and Other Measures) Bill 2014.83 
 
 
                                                             
78The UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR statement on Australia-Cambodia agreement on refugee relocation, press 
releases, 26 September 2014.  
http://unhcr.org.au/unhcr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=513:unhcr-statement-
on-australia-cambodia-agreement-on-refugee-relocation&catid=35:news-a-media&Itemid=63 
79The UN Refugee Agency, above n 58, (Manus Island) 3. 
80Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth) 
81LNP Coalition, above n 2, 16. 
82Introduced to House of Representatives 25 September 2014. 
83Introduced to Senate 25 September 2014. 




1. Temporary Protection Visas 
 
The policy on TPVs denies refugees access to permanent residency and to 
family reunions, and revisits people’s refugee status when conditions in their home 
country change.  The policy on TPVs also aims to deny a product for people 
smugglers to sell.84 
 
The Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload Bill re-introduces TPVs and creates the 
new Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV), involving working in regional areas for 3.5 
years (out of 5) to gain eligibility for other onshore visas other than a permanent 
protection visa.85 
 
2. Changes to Visa Assessment Processes 
 
The Protection and Other Measures Bill 201486makes significant changes to the 
way asylum seekers are assessed, including to: increase asylum seeker responsibilities 
to substantiate protection claims; direct the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) to draw 
an unfavourable inference about the credibility of new claims or evidence raised at the 
review stage; and create grounds to refuse a protection visa when an applicant fails to 
establish their identity.87  
 
The Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload Bill88introduces a fast-track assessment 
process for asylum seekers (arriving from 13 August 2012).  The fast-track process 
will replace access to the RRT with a new Immigration Assessment Authority 
(IAA),89which will conduct a review 'on the papers', with no general duty to accept or 




                                                             
84LNP Coalition, above n 2, 5. 
85Hon Scott Morrison MP, above n 24. 
86Migration Amendment (Protection and Other Measures) Bill 2014 (Cth). 
87Hon Scott Morrison MP, Second Reading Speech, Migration Amendment (Protection And Other 
Measures) Bill 2014 (Cth), Introduced to Senate, 25 September 2014. 
88Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 
2014 
89Hon Scott Morrison, above n 24. 
90Ibid. 
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The Bill also proposes to give the Minister power to place a ‘cap’ on the 
number of protection visas issued in any year, which would overturn the High Court 
decision Plaintiff S297/2013 v MIBP.91 
 
B. Australia’s international human rights obligations 
 
1. Temporary Protection Visas 
 
Temporary protection for refugees is not prohibited under the Refugee 
Convention. However, UNHCR describes it as a group based protection mechanism 
in contexts of mass displacement, where an individualized assessment is not possible, 
and notes that an approach that is punitive or deterrent in nature or prolongs 
uncertainty would be of concern.92  Australia’s approach prolongs uncertainty and 
aims to deter ‘people smugglers’ and in doing so deters asylum seekers.   
 
An additional concern in relation to Australia’s approach to temporary 
protection is that the SHEV attempts to turn human rights treaty obligations into a 
discretionary skilled migration program.93 
 
2. Changes to Visa Assessment Processes 
 
The proposed changes significantly alter the way refugee status assessments 
are conducted in Australia.  Together they could remove current procedural human 
rights safeguards, leading to the engagement of Australia’s non-refoulement 






                                                             
91[2014] HCA 24. 
92The UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR statement:Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation 
Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014, 26 September 2014. 
93Andrew &RenataKaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, Legislative brief, Migration and 
Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014, 2 
October 2014,  
3.http://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/sites/kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/files/legislative_brief_migrati
on_amendment_resolving_the_asylum_legacy_caseload_final.pdf 
94Australian Human Rights Commission, above n 4, 25. 




iAsylum seeker responsibility to present their claims 
 
The Bill specifies the Minister has no obligation to assist in the specification 
or establishment of a claim.  UNHCR’s Handbook95 states that ‘while the burden of 
proof in principle rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the 
relevant facts is shared between the applicant and the examiner’.96  The Bill does not 
comply with this guideline.  
 
iiRefusal on grounds of failure to establish identity 
 
The Refugee Convention97 acknowledges that persons may be forced to enter 
and stay in a territory without the requisite authorization including with fraudulent 
documents.98  Lack of such acknowledgement in the assessment process could put 
Australia at risk of engaging its non-refoulement obligations. 
 
iiiImmigration Assessment Authority (IAA) 
 
The restrictive processes to be employed by the proposed IAA (to replace the 
RRT) are likely to result in fewer successful reviews.  In 2011–12 the RRT overturned 
82.4 per cent of primary decisions to refuse protection visas for asylum seekers who 
arrived by boat.99  A poorer result would risk engaging Australia’s non-refoulement 
obligations. 
 
ivCap on protection visas  
 
This creates real risks of arbitrary and prolonged detention, as those whose 
applications are ‘suspended’ are liable to detention until the ‘cap’ is lifted.100 
 
 
                                                             
95The UN Refugee Agency, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, [196]. 
96Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs Legislation Committee,Inquiry into the Migration Amendment (Protection and Other Measures) Bill 2014, 
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If the OSB policies examined in this paper are implemented the overall effect 
would be that: 
 
a) Asylum seekers who attempt to arrive in Australia by boat will not make it to 
Australia, and some will be sent to RPCs.  Those assessed as refugees will not be 
resettled in Australia. 
b) Asylum seekers already transferred to RPCs and those who will be sent will be 
detained for long periods in very poor conditions awaiting assessment of their 
claims.  They are unlikely to have any certainty about how, when and/or if their 
claims will be assessed.  They are at risk of being offered resettlement options 
which seriously risk their safety. 
c) Asylum seekers already arrived in Australia by boat prior to 19 July 2013 will be 
assessed more rapidly and with fewer procedural protections, and will be offered 
only temporary protection if granted refugee status.  Fewer of these people will be 
assessed as refugees than would have been previously.  The number of people in 
Australian detention centres will continue to diminish and the detention centres 
will continue to close. 
 
With this shift in outcomes for people seeking asylum in Australia under OSB, 
human rights concerns shift from Australia’s own asylum seeker assessment and 
resettlement processes towards the lack of human rights safeguards Australia has put 
in place under its offshore regime.  In addition, new human rights concerns arise in 
relation to Australia’s current attempt to deal with the remnant population of asylum 
seekers who arrived by boat before 19 July 2013 and are still detained in Australia.    
 
While broad parameters of the OSB are not unlawful at international law 
(offshore processing, temporary protection, third country resettlement), both the way 
OSB is being implemented and its results engage a range of human rights obligations 
and indicate a general deterioration in Australia’s commitment to meeting its human 
rights obligations to asylum seekers who arrive by boat.  Further, the overall effect of 
OSB is that Australia shifts it commitments to asylum seekers, with the associated 
burdens, to developing countries.   
 
 
 
